AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SocialChoice.Voting.ResoluteStrategyproofness

defimported Lean

Strategyproofness for resolute rules: changing one ballot cannot produce a strictly better unique winner for the deviating voter.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset in
variable {N A : Type*} in
variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in
def SocialChoice.Voting.ResoluteStrategyproofness (f : VotingRule N A) (_hf : Resolute f) : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.ResoluteStrategyproofness`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset in
variable {N A : Type*} in
variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in
/-- Strategyproofness for resolute rules: changing one ballot cannot produce a strictly better unique winner for the deviating voter. -/
def SocialChoice.Voting.ResoluteStrategyproofness (f : VotingRule N A) (_hf : Resolute f) : Prop :=
  ∀ (P : Profile N A) (i : N) (r : LinearOrder A) (a b : A),
    f P = {a} →
    f (updateProfile P i r) = {b} →
    ¬ Prefers P i b a
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