BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimPaymentIntegrand
defimported Lean
Payment integrand for interim payment.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in noncomputable def BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimPaymentIntegrand (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (i : I) (z_i : ℝ) (t : OpponentTypeProfile I i) : ℝ
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimPaymentIntegrand`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimPaymentIntegrand← BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimPaymentIntegrand (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:667): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 17
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- OpponentTypeProfileOpponent type profiles for real-valued auction types.
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfileThe reported type profile obtained by combining
zᵢwith an opponent profilet₋ᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 11
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurable_of_boundA.e. strong measurability and bounds imply interim integrability.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasIntegrableInterimPayment_of_aestronglyMeasurable_of_boundBounded a.e. strongly measurable payment integrands are integrable.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasIntegrableInterimPaymentPayment integrands are integrable.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrandQuasi-linear utility integrand.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_eq_integral_interimPaymentIntegrandThe generic interim expectation specializes to the payment integrand.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimPaymentIntegrand_boundFor each fixed report, the constructed Myerson payment integrand is bounded uniformly over opponent profiles.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurableOnce the constructed allocation and payment integrands are measurable, boundedness gives interim integrability for the constructed auction.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSICPointwise DSIC inequality for the interim utility integrand.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.integral_interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_eqThe utility integrand integrates to interim utility.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_zero_of_isZeroNormalizedA zero-normalized payment rule has zero interim expected payment at type
0. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.integrable_interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrandUtility integrability from allocation and payment integrability.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in /-- Payment integrand for interim payment. -/ noncomputable def BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimPaymentIntegrand (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (i : I) (z_i : ℝ) (t : OpponentTypeProfile I i) : ℝ := A.paymentRule (reportProfile i z_i t) i