BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSIC
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Pointwise DSIC inequality for the interim utility integrand.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSIC [DecidableEq I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hdsic : A.IsDSIC) (i : I) (t_i z_i : ℝ) (t : OpponentTypeProfile I i) : A.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand i t_i z_i t ≤ A.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand i t_i t_i t
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSIC`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSIC← BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSIC (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:1096): adapted
What was changed in
BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSIC--- EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:1096 (BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSIC) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,3 +1,7 @@ -/-- Pointwise DSIC inequality for the interim utility integrand. -/ -theorem interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSIC +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open BayesianSingleItemAuction in +open MeasureTheory in +variable {I : Type*} in +theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSIC [DecidableEq I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hdsic : A.IsDSIC) @@ -10,3 +14,3 @@ MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame, IsWeaklyDominant, WeaklyDominates, - StrategicGame.deviate, interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand, + EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate, interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand, interimAllocationIntegrand, interimPaymentIntegrand] using h - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 30
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting
θᵢis weakly dominant for… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrandQuasi-linear utility integrand.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimPaymentIntegrandPayment integrand for interim payment.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocationIntegrandAllocation integrand for interim probability.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- MechanismWithTransfers.isDSICDSIC for a mechanism with transfers, relative to an externally supplied utility rule.
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- OpponentTypeProfileOpponent type profiles for real-valued auction types.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGameThe strategic game induced by a transfer mechanism and an external utility rule. Utility is supplied as a function of: - allocation -…
- SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfileThe reported type profile obtained by combining
zᵢwith an opponent profilet₋ᵢ. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateUnilateral deviation in a game-bound profile: player
iswitches tos', while all other players keep their current strategies. - MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 1
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIncentiveCompatible_of_isDSICDSIC implies interim IC under interim integrability.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- Pointwise DSIC inequality for the interim utility integrand. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSIC [DecidableEq I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hdsic : A.IsDSIC) (i : I) (t_i z_i : ℝ) (t : OpponentTypeProfile I i) : A.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand i t_i z_i t ≤ A.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand i t_i t_i t := by have h := hdsic (reportProfile i t_i t) i z_i (reportProfile i t_i t) simpa [SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSIC, MechanismWithTransfers.isDSIC, MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame, IsWeaklyDominant, WeaklyDominates, EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate, interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand, interimAllocationIntegrand, interimPaymentIntegrand] using h