SocialChoice.Voting.isWeaklyDecisiveFor_of_isDecisiveFor
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
SocialChoice.Voting.isWeaklyDecisiveFor_of_isDecisiveFor
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N A : Type*} in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.isWeaklyDecisiveFor_of_isDecisiveFor [Fintype N] [Fintype A] {F : SWF N A} {C : Set N} {a b : A} (h : IsDecisiveFor F C a b) : IsWeaklyDecisiveFor F C a b
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.isWeaklyDecisiveFor_of_isDecisiveFor`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.isWeaklyDecisiveFor_of_isDecisiveFor← SocialChoice.Voting.isWeaklyDecisiveFor_of_isDecisiveFor (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Decisive.lean:83): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 7
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.PrefersVoter
istrictly prefersatobin profileP. - SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWFA social welfare function maps strict profiles to a weak social preference.
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsDecisiveForA coalition is decisive for
aoverbif unanimous strict support inside the coalition forces the social strict preferencea ≻ b. - SocialChoice.Voting.IsWeaklyDecisiveForWeak decisiveness tests a coalition against a complement unanimously supporting the opposite strict ranking.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N A : Type*} intheorem SocialChoice.Voting.isWeaklyDecisiveFor_of_isDecisiveFor [Fintype N] [Fintype A] {F : SWF N A} {C : Set N} {a b : A} (h : IsDecisiveFor F C a b) : IsWeaklyDecisiveFor F C a b := by intro P hP exact h P hP.left