SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forward
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forward
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N A : Type*} in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forward [Fintype N] [Fintype A] {F : SWF N A} (hU : SWF.Unanimity F) (hIIA : SWF.IIA F) {C : Set N} {x y z : A} (hxy : x ≠ y) (hxz : x ≠ z) (hyz : y ≠ z) (h : IsWeaklyDecisiveFor F C x y) : IsDecisiveFor F C x z
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forward`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forward← SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forward (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Decisive.lean:404): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 16
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- IsPreferenceA weak preference relation is admissible if it is reflexive, transitive, and total.
- SocialChoice.Voting.PrefersVoter
istrictly prefersatobin profileP. - SocialChoice.Voting.iia_strictSocialChoice.Voting.iia_strict
- SocialChoice.Voting.modifiedForwardProfileSocialChoice.Voting.modifiedForwardProfile
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.IIAIndependence of irrelevant alternatives for SWFs.
- strictStrict preference derived from a weak preference relation.
- SocialChoice.Voting.modifiedForwardProfile_specSocialChoice.Voting.modifiedForwardProfile_spec
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.UnanimityUnanimity/Pareto for SWFs: unanimous strict preference forces social strict preference.
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWFA social welfare function maps strict profiles to a weak social preference.
- strict_transitiveDerived strict preference is transitive when the weak relation is transitive.
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsDecisiveForA coalition is decisive for
aoverbif unanimous strict support inside the coalition forces the social strict preferencea ≻ b. - SocialChoice.Voting.IsWeaklyDecisiveForWeak decisiveness tests a coalition against a complement unanimously supporting the opposite strict ranking.
- PrefA bundled weak preference relation. Use this interface when several agents may rank the same outcome type differently. Use…
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N A : Type*} intheorem SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forward [Fintype N] [Fintype A] {F : SWF N A} (hU : SWF.Unanimity F) (hIIA : SWF.IIA F) {C : Set N} {x y z : A} (hxy : x ≠ y) (hxz : x ≠ z) (hyz : y ≠ z) (h : IsWeaklyDecisiveFor F C x y) : IsDecisiveFor F C x z := by classical intro P hP let Q := modifiedForwardProfile P C x y z hxy hxz hyz have hQ := modifiedForwardProfile_spec P C hxy hxz hyz hP have hxz : ∀ i, Prefers P i x z ↔ Prefers Q i x z := fun i => (hQ i).1 have hzx : ∀ i, Prefers P i z x ↔ Prefers Q i z x := fun i => (hQ i).2.1 rw [iia_strict hIIA hxz hzx] exact strict_transitive (F Q).prop.transitive (h Q ⟨fun i hi => (hQ i).2.2.1 hi |>.1, fun i hi => (hQ i).2.2.2 hi |>.1⟩) (hU Q y z (fun i => by by_cases hi : i ∈ C · exact (hQ i).2.2.1 hi |>.2 · exact (hQ i).2.2.2 hi |>.2))