AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SocialChoice.Voting.IsDecisiveFor

defimported Lean

A coalition is decisive for a over b if unanimous strict support inside the coalition forces the social strict preference a ≻ b.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {N A : Type*} in
def SocialChoice.Voting.IsDecisiveFor [Fintype N] [Fintype A]
    (F : SWF N A) (C : Set N) (a b : A) : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.IsDecisiveFor`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {N A : Type*} in
/-- A coalition is decisive for `a` over `b` if unanimous strict support inside the coalition forces the social strict preference `a ≻ b`. -/
def SocialChoice.Voting.IsDecisiveFor [Fintype N] [Fintype A]
    (F : SWF N A) (C : Set N) (a b : A) : Prop :=
  ∀ P : Profile N A, (∀ i ∈ C, Prefers P i a b) → strict (F P) a b
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