SocialChoice.Voting.IsWeaklyDecisiveFor
defimported Lean
Weak decisiveness tests a coalition against a complement unanimously supporting the opposite strict ranking.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N A : Type*} in def SocialChoice.Voting.IsWeaklyDecisiveFor [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (F : SWF N A) (C : Set N) (a b : A) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.IsWeaklyDecisiveFor`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.IsWeaklyDecisiveFor← SocialChoice.Voting.IsWeaklyDecisiveFor (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Decisive.lean:77): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 7
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.PrefersVoter
istrictly prefersatobin profileP. - strictStrict preference derived from a weak preference relation.
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWFA social welfare function maps strict profiles to a weak social preference.
- PrefA bundled weak preference relation. Use this interface when several agents may rank the same outcome type differently. Use…
- Used by 2
- SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forwardSocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forward
- SocialChoice.Voting.isWeaklyDecisiveFor_of_isDecisiveForSocialChoice.Voting.isWeaklyDecisiveFor_of_isDecisiveFor
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N A : Type*} in /-- Weak decisiveness tests a coalition against a complement unanimously supporting the opposite strict ranking. -/ def SocialChoice.Voting.IsWeaklyDecisiveFor [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (F : SWF N A) (C : Set N) (a b : A) : Prop := ∀ P : Profile N A, (∀ i ∈ C, Prefers P i a b) ∧ (∀ i ∉ C, Prefers P i b a) → strict (F P) a b