SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorial
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorial
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N A : Type*} in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorial [Fintype N] [Fintype A] [Subsingleton N] [Nonempty N] {F : SWF N A} (h : SWF.Unanimity F) : SWF.Dictatorial F
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorial`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorial← SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorial (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Decisive.lean:65): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 9
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.PrefersVoter
istrictly prefersatobin profileP. - strictStrict preference derived from a weak preference relation.
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.UnanimityUnanimity/Pareto for SWFs: unanimous strict preference forces social strict preference.
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWFA social welfare function maps strict profiles to a weak social preference.
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.DictatorialA SWF is dictatorial if one voter always determines every strict social comparison.
- PrefA bundled weak preference relation. Use this interface when several agents may rank the same outcome type differently. Use…
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N A : Type*} intheorem SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorial [Fintype N] [Fintype A] [Subsingleton N] [Nonempty N] {F : SWF N A} (h : SWF.Unanimity F) : SWF.Dictatorial F := by refine ⟨(Classical.ofNonempty : N), ?_⟩ intro P a b hab apply h intro j rw [← Subsingleton.allEq (Classical.ofNonempty : N) j] exact hab