SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.Dictatorial
defimported Lean
A SWF is dictatorial if one voter always determines every strict social comparison.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in def SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.Dictatorial (F : SWF N A) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.Dictatorial`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.Dictatorial← SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.Dictatorial (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:241): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 7
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.PrefersVoter
istrictly prefersatobin profileP. - strictStrict preference derived from a weak preference relation.
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWFA social welfare function maps strict profiles to a weak social preference.
- PrefA bundled weak preference relation. Use this interface when several agents may rank the same outcome type differently. Use…
- Used by 2
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.NonDictatorialA SWF is non-dictatorial.
- SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorialSocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorial
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in /-- A SWF is dictatorial if one voter always determines every strict social comparison. -/ def SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.Dictatorial (F : SWF N A) : Prop := ∃ i : N, ∀ (P : Profile N A) (a b : A), Prefers P i a b → strict (F P) a b