SingleParameterMechanism.payment_sandwich
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
For a DSIC single-parameter mechanism, fixing all other bids yields the standard two-sided bound on payment differences.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open SingleParameterMechanism in variable {I : Type*} in theorem SingleParameterMechanism.payment_sandwich [DecidableEq I] {x p : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ} (hdsic : ({ allocationRule := x, paymentRule := p } : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ).IsDSIC) (b : I → ℝ) (i : I) (y z : ℝ) : z * (x (Function.update b i y) i - x (Function.update b i z) i) ≤ p (Function.update b i y) i - p (Function.update b i z) i ∧ p (Function.update b i y) i - p (Function.update b i z) i ≤ y * (x (Function.update b i y) i - x (Function.update b i z) i)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SingleParameterMechanism.payment_sandwich`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SingleParameterMechanism.payment_sandwich← SingleParameterMechanism.payment_sandwich (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Myerson.lean:113): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 12
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting
θᵢis weakly dominant for… - MechanismWithTransfers.isDSICDSIC for a mechanism with transfers, relative to an externally supplied utility rule.
- SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGameThe strategic game induced by a transfer mechanism and an external utility rule. Utility is supplied as a function of: - allocation -…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateUnilateral deviation in a game-bound profile: player
iswitches tos', while all other players keep their current strategies. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - SingleParameterMechanism.paymentThe payment vector induced by a bid profile in a single-parameter mechanism. This is just the inherited…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting
- Used by 1
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_difference_boundIf two payment rules implement the same allocation rule in DSIC form, then their difference along a one-dimensional deviation is…
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen SingleParameterMechanism invariable {I : Type*} in/-- For a DSIC single-parameter mechanism, fixing all other bids yields the standard two-sided bound on payment differences. -/theorem SingleParameterMechanism.payment_sandwich [DecidableEq I] {x p : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ} (hdsic : ({ allocationRule := x, paymentRule := p } : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ).IsDSIC) (b : I → ℝ) (i : I) (y z : ℝ) : z * (x (Function.update b i y) i - x (Function.update b i z) i) ≤ p (Function.update b i y) i - p (Function.update b i z) i ∧ p (Function.update b i y) i - p (Function.update b i z) i ≤ y * (x (Function.update b i y) i - x (Function.update b i z) i) := by let vy : I → ℝ := Function.update b i y have h1 : y * x (Function.update b i z) i - p (Function.update b i z) i ≤ y * x (Function.update b i y) i - p (Function.update b i y) i := by have := hdsic vy i z b simpa [SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSIC, MechanismWithTransfers.isDSIC, MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame, IsWeaklyDominant, WeaklyDominates, SingleParameterMechanism.payment, vy] using this let vz : I → ℝ := Function.update b i z have h2 : z * x (Function.update b i y) i - p (Function.update b i y) i ≤ z * x (Function.update b i z) i - p (Function.update b i z) i := by have := hdsic vz i y b simpa [SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSIC, MechanismWithTransfers.isDSIC, MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame, IsWeaklyDominant, WeaklyDominates, SingleParameterMechanism.payment, vz] using this constructor <;> linarith