SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.IIA
defimported Lean
Independence of irrelevant alternatives for SWFs.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in def SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.IIA (F : SWF N A) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.IIA`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.IIA← SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.IIA (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:234): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 6
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.PrefersVoter
istrictly prefersatobin profileP. - SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWFA social welfare function maps strict profiles to a weak social preference.
- PrefA bundled weak preference relation. Use this interface when several agents may rank the same outcome type differently. Use…
- Used by 2
- SocialChoice.Voting.iia_strictSocialChoice.Voting.iia_strict
- SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forwardSocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forward
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in /-- Independence of irrelevant alternatives for SWFs. -/ def SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.IIA (F : SWF N A) : Prop := ∀ (P Q : Profile N A) (a b : A), (∀ i : N, Prefers P i a b ↔ Prefers Q i a b) → (F P a b ↔ F Q a b)