SocialChoice.Voting.iia_strict
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
SocialChoice.Voting.iia_strict
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N A : Type*} in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.iia_strict [Fintype N] [Fintype A] {F : SWF N A} (hF : SWF.IIA F) {P Q : Profile N A} {a b : A} (hab : ∀ i, Prefers P i a b ↔ Prefers Q i a b) (hba : ∀ i, Prefers P i b a ↔ Prefers Q i b a) : strict (F P) a b ↔ strict (F Q) a b
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.iia_strict`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.iia_strict← SocialChoice.Voting.iia_strict (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Decisive.lean:89): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 8
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.PrefersVoter
istrictly prefersatobin profileP. - SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.IIAIndependence of irrelevant alternatives for SWFs.
- strictStrict preference derived from a weak preference relation.
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWFA social welfare function maps strict profiles to a weak social preference.
- PrefA bundled weak preference relation. Use this interface when several agents may rank the same outcome type differently. Use…
- Used by 1
- SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forwardSocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forward
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N A : Type*} intheorem SocialChoice.Voting.iia_strict [Fintype N] [Fintype A] {F : SWF N A} (hF : SWF.IIA F) {P Q : Profile N A} {a b : A} (hab : ∀ i, Prefers P i a b ↔ Prefers Q i a b) (hba : ∀ i, Prefers P i b a ↔ Prefers Q i b a) : strict (F P) a b ↔ strict (F Q) a b := by simp [strict, hF P Q a b hab, hF P Q b a hba]